Posted at 08:27 AM ET, 09/28/2005
Disabling Able Danger
In April 2000, Able Danger, only months old, was abruptly shut down. Caught violating Reagan administration Executive Orders and Defense Department and Army regulations restricting intelligence agencies from collecting information on United States "persons," the highly compartmented cell within the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) was halted in its effort to use data mining and link analysis to characterize the worldwide nature of the al Qaeda terrorist network. 

Anthony Shaffer, the whistle blower who went public in August, claims lawyers shut down the operation just at the point that it named and identified 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta. 

As I wrote yesterday, Shaffer is pretty lonely in his recollections. Of some 80 people interviewed by the Defense Department as part of its Able Danger internal investigation, the Pentagon says that three additional workers remember seeing either a chart with a photo or a reference to Mohamed Atta. 

The general in charge of the Special Operations Command, Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, also went on the record this weekend telling the St. Petersburg Times that he was "pretty sure" Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta before 9/11. 

Two Defense Department lawyers familiar with the case told me that there is no evidence that lawyers directed the destruction of information nor restricted any sharing of useful intelligence with the FBI, as Shaffer claims. 

The real story here is how another renegade intelligence effort subsisting on hyper secrecy ran afoul of regulations first implemented in the Ford administration when U.S. intelligence agencies were caught collecting information on community, religious and labor leaders, civil rights protestors, and anti-Vietnam war demonstrators. 

"What began as a force protection mission for DOD organizations, evolved, through mission creep, lack of clear rules, and the lack of meaningful oversight, into an abuse of … Constitutional rights…," William Dugan, Pentagon chief of intelligence oversight, said last week. He was describing the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s. 

Shaffer and others use words like "out-of-the-box" and "entrepreneurial" to describe the LIWA intelligence collection. The buzz words suggest, of course, that other intelligence efforts were in-the-box and boring, that only the LIWA and other compartmented workers were motivated and insightful enough to take chances, that if the lawyers and the bureaucrats and the Clintonistas and the other villains had just gotten out of the way, there would have been no 9/11. If only… 

But in 2000, the problem was also a pretty simple one: An off-the-books intelligence effort once again abused the "force protection" justification to collect information on Americans. Military commanders, mindful of the law and regulations, shut down the operation. 

When Able Danger approached LIWA in 1999 to help with the al Qaeda campaign plan, the organization was already involved in a number of highly classified counter-terrorism data mining efforts. LIWA's al Qaeda project collected 2.5 terabytes of "open source" information, Shaffer says, a ridiculously immense amount of data equivalent to 500 million pages of text or a pile of paper 30,000 miles high if it were all printed out -- court records, news databases, credit card and telephone records. "Anything we could get our hands on," says Shaffer. 

"Open source" here means unclassified information, that is, information that has not been collected and compiled by U.S. intelligence, for example, intelligence information derived from electronic eavesdropping or human agents that the United States classifies at birth. 

However, the open source label tends to hide the real problem the Able Danger sponsored effort ran into. 

"They were not only using advanced data mining technology, they were also looking at data that no one else was looking at," Shaffer says. 

According to military sources familiar with the Able Danger legal side, the effort stepped over the line when LIWA contractors purchased photographic collections of people entering and exiting mosques in the United States and overseas. One source says that LIWA contractors dealt with a questionable source of photographs in California, either a white supremacy group or some other anti-Islamic organization. 

"There are records of who goes where regarding visits to mosques," Shaffer told Government Security News. "That was the data that LIWA was buying off the Internet from information brokers." It was stuff no one else bothered to look at, says Shaffer. 

LIWA purchased an open-source, six-month data run, Shaffer says, and analysts developed a set of eight data points common to 1993 World Trade Center bombers and associates. With advanced software, including facial recognition software able to track individuals from the collected photographs, Shaffer says contractors "made the link between [Mohammed] Atta and [Sheik Omar Abdel] Rahman, the first World Trade Center bomber." 

Thomas Gandy, Army Director of Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence, said at the September 1 Pentagon briefing that the problem with LIWA’s work was that "it was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put (it) in one pile." Thus there was a "commingling of U.S. person data" with other data. The contractors and software specialists did not take precautions to tag data from different sources or to segregate information about wholly innocent Americans of Islamic faith from others who were not US persons. 

Gandy says "there was no perceived imminent threat" or "imminent crime going to occur" that might have justified retention of the gigantic database. Under the regulations, LIWA could have argued that it indeed was on to something and sought justification to continue, but the truth seems to be that while LIWA workers and contractor might have seen what there were doing as actual detective work to uncover terrorists, Able Danger and SOCOM saw the project mostly as an experiment to prove the usefulness of the technology.

So just months after LIWA began its seat-of-the-pants effort, it was directed to destroy its 2.5 terabytes. 

(Tomorrow: The Law Takes Hold) 

Note to readers: In my original posting, I used the spelling "Mohammed" that readers latched onto as some perhaps some kind of conspiracy on my part.  It was an error to spell Atta's name different than he did in his visa applications and on his Florida drivers license.  Though I hesitate to quote the 911 Commission's spelling as so many readers think that is a conspiracy as well. According to the Wikipedia entry, Atta used "several aliases and alternate spellings, including Mehan Atta, Mohammed Atta, Mohammad El Amir, Mohamed El Sayed, Muhammad Muhammad Al Amir Awag Al Sayyid Atta, and Muhammad Muhammad Al-Amir Awad Al Sayad.  The will that he allegedly wrote in 1996 gives his name as 'Mohamed Mohamed Elamir Awad Elsayed.'" 

I did a LexisNexis search of the last 90 days of news to check the prevailing spelling. There were 482 hits for "Mohammed Atta" and 528 for "Mohamed Atta." The Washington Post convention is Mohamed Atta.

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (19) | TrackBack (2) 

Posted at 08:38 AM ET, 09/27/2005
The Secret History of Able Danger
Ever since Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) claimed in August that Pentagon analysts had identified 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta in early 2000, a secret intelligence operation code named Able Danger has become the latest fantasy of left and right wing conspiracy theorists.

The matter was to have come to a head last week when the Senate Judiciary Committee held a special Able Danger hearing. But the Pentagon declined to allow even unclassified testimony at the open hearing, arguing that the matter better rested with the Intelligence Committee.

Chairman Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) accused the Pentagon of "stonewalling," and all of a sudden, Weldon seemed vindicated in his claims that the Defense Department, and the 9/11 Commission, had something to hide.

The Pentagon is hiding something. But it’s not what Weldon thinks.

First, to debunk the myths:

As best as I can determine, having spent tens of hours talking to military sources involved with the issue, intelligence analysts did not identify anyone prior to 9/11, Mohammed Atta included, as a suspect in any upcoming terrorist attack. 
It is not even clear that a "Mohammed Atta" was identified, let alone that it is the same Atta who died on 9/11. 
No military lawyers prevented intelligence sleuths from passing useful information to the FBI. 
Able Danger itself was not an intelligence program.
As a representative of U.S. Special Operations Command said at a special Pentagon briefing arranged on September 1, Able Danger "was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort" to begin building a war on terrorism.  This is the real story.

In early October 1999, three months after Osama bin Laden was added to the U.S. “ten most wanted” list as the mastermind behind the attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and more than a year after President Clinton signed a Presidential Directive laying out a renewed counter-terrorism program, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton, tasked U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to develop a "campaign plan" against transnational terrorism, specifically al Qaeda.  The code name assigned to the planning effort, and the name of the cell of about 10 planners in SOCOM was Able Danger.

Like most government activity associated with counter-terrorism in the late 1990's, Able Danger was a "compartmented" effort. After the 1998 embassy bombings, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger directed that a tightly compartmented process be put in place to keep all counter-terrorism military planning secret. Under “this” Polo Step compartment, the Navy was required to station a force of Tomahawk cruise missile-shooting submarines off the Pakistani coast at all times, and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), regionally responsible for Afghanistan, worked with the Joint Chiefs to develop a set of 13 military options against Al Qaeda under a war plan called Infinite Resolve.

As the Able Danger cell began its work, its first questions were: What is al Qaeda? How big is it? Where is it?

As the 9/11 Commission said in its final report: "Despite the availability of information that al Qaeda was a global network … policymakers knew little about the organization. The reams of new information that the CIA’s Bin Laden unit had been developing since 1996 had not been pulled together and synthesized for the rest of the government."

Able Danger reached out to intelligence organizations that were not only involved in monitoring al Qaeda, but also those that were specialists in synthesizing new information.

One such organization was the new Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), a part of the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). LIWA was organized in March 1995 to integrate "information warfare" into Army operations. On paper, that meant everything from manning new command centers in order to protect Army Internet connections from hackers to providing support for battlefield "psychological operations."

But LIWA, along with other information warfare organizations, was also developing offensive information warfare capabilities, including computer network attack and other cyber-related covert operations. And for that, there was a widespread recognition of the need for intelligence of much higher "granularity," or specificity, particularly about people, than had ever before been compiled on a large scale.

Starting in 1996, LIWA deployed teams to Bosnia.  They were part of a new vanguard of information warriors.  They required detailed information on factions and individuals: decision-maker identities, biases and inter-relationships, identification of critical communications and information links and nodes, demographic data, populace biases and pre-dispositions.  The goal was to harness this information to determine potential pressure points to leverage decision-maker/populace behaviors.

(Illustration: An information warfare "matrix" used by LIWA in Bosnia.  The field support team employed data mining and link analysis to build a picture of pressure points associated with the Bosnian leadership, the same kind of modeling it would later employ on al Qaeda for Able Danger.)
 

Back at Ft. Belvoir, VA, the LIWA Advanced Concepts and Analysis division, and later the Army's Information Dominance Center (IDC) was employing new means for achieving "information dominance." With the explosion of electronic information and the ability to move vast quantities of data quickly, analysts were increasingly facing the same problem confronting forensic accountants, insurance fraud investigators, and bank examiners: Large amounts of data was increasingly available, but it needed to be put in relational form in order to develop patterns, and then sense needed to be made of the patterns to reveal what had already happened or was about to happen.

In academia, in government, in the information industry, even in marketing, hundreds of different technical approaches were being pursued, both classified and unclassified. One such effort immediately enlisted by the U.S. intelligence community and information targeteers was data mining, a capability to discover new patterns of indicators that identify events of interest when they cannot be directly observed. Data mining techniques applied to large "transaction" databases (travel or credit card records or telephone logs) could be used to uncover clandestine relationships or activities. 

Another method being developed was social network analysis. This analyzes the types and frequencies of interactions among people to determine formal and informal leadership hierarchies.

In the intelligence community, most of the early data mining and link analysis efforts involved monitoring terrorist financial transactions. For example, after Somalia disintegrated in 1991 and many Somalis migrated to the U.S. and Europe, they began to send money home via the "al-Barakaat" network of money remitters.  In October 1996, the FBI began to track connections between the al-Barakaat system and terrorist groups, and in the late 1990's, the intelligence community, using similar analysis to track money transfers, began to draw links between al-Barakaat and Osama bin Laden.

Inside the intelligence community, at LIWA and other organizations, data mining and link analysis was being conducted on elite and so-called “crony” networks in Bosnia (and later in Serbia during Kosovo operations), on international drug cartels, on corruption and contract killings in Russia, on weapons proliferation and sensitive trade with China, and on terrorist linkages in the Far East.

In December 1999, LIWA was approached by SOCOM to support Able Danger by conducting data mining and link analysis of the al Qaeda network. The project was initially focused on unclassified data mining using U.S. and foreign news databases, commercially available records of financial transactions, court records, licenses, travel records and phone books. The goal was to find links between potential or known terrorists. Analysts used "spiders" -- automated robots -- to go out on the Internet and collect whatever they could. "Anything we could get our hands on," says Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Army reserve whistle blower who was assigned to the LIWA effort.

Using the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and associated lists of suspect individuals as a starting point, LIWA began to compile databases of "associated" individuals, and then they began to "data mine" their mountains of collected records to find links between them.  What they ended up with—and what is still being hidden today—is the questionable (read: potentially illegal) collection and acquisition of information on American citizens before and after 9/11.

(Tomorrow: Overreach and how the data-mining project goes awry.)

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (51) 

Posted at 06:00 AM ET, 09/26/2005
Great Games
Rita and Katrina will surely stoke the fires of those who want U.S. forces out of Iraq, as much as it will embolden those who argue that because U.S. military forces are at a breaking point in Iraq, the Army should be increased in size. But it's also good to remind ourselves that there is a lot more going on, and a fabulous worldwide military infrastructure to support not just operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but other pockets of the American empire. I'm a close watcher of military exercises, one of the best ways to gauge what the military is really doing and thinking. Here are some of the latest.

Bright Star 05/06, the largest military exercise the U.S. conducts in the Middle East, began in western Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea September 10. Scheduled every two years (but canceled in 2003 because of the Iraq war), the current six week versions includes air, naval, amphibious and special operations field training by Egyptian and U.S. soldiers, with contingents from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UK. Overall, some 16,000 military personnel are involved. Observers from "up to" 36 countries are also present during the war games, U.S. officials say. Paratroopers from Egypt, Germany, Jordan and the Netherlands jumped with the 82nd Airborne on September 15. The Pakistani press has also reported the presence of the Special Services Group (I thought they were busy hunting for Al Qaeda?).

While the U.S. is busy in Egypt fighting the last war, Russia and Uzbekistan conducted their first ever bilateral exercise last week. In July, after U.S. criticism of the bloody suppression of a rebellion in the Uzbek town of Andijan in May, Uzbekistan told the U.S. military it would have six months to vacate the "K2" base at Kharshi-Khanabad. K2 was one of the key Afghanistan staging bases for the CIA and special operations forces in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and had up until this summer been a showcase for those who argue the value of peacetime military relations: if we hadn't been cozy with Uzbekistan and conducting exercises in the late 1990's, we wouldn't have been able to move so quickly, the argument goes. 

Military sources tell me that it is unlikely that K2 will be replaced with a new full-fledged base in Central Asia. But Tajikistan hinted last week that it could host some US military equipment and personnel, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander Gen. John Abizaid, was in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on August 23.

Another major U.S. base in the region, in Kyrgyzstan, is an obvious candidate for increased activity, but Kyrgyzstan has been under pressure from Russia and China who demand that it set a date for U.S. withdrawal from Manas. But the race is on: Russia has established its own military airbase in Kyrgyzstan and last year it also won approval to keep its 6,000 troop-strong 201st Division at a permanent base in Tajikistan. Of course the U.S. does have major bases in Afghanistan, and maintains a couple of important secret bases in Pakistan.

Though Pakistan gets to participate in varsity U.S. military exercises like Bright Star, there must be some anxiety at the flurry of "next war" military activity by the United States with India. Yesterday the U.S. and India began the nine-day naval exercise "Malabar 05" in the North Arabian Sea. The exercise, the eighth in the U.S.-Indian series, includes the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and its battle group operating Indian Navy counterparts. The thrust of Malabar 05 is "counter-terrorism operations at sea," says Rear Admiral D.K. Joshi, the Indian Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. The exercise includes U.S. P-3C Orion P3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft operating from Dabolim in Goa (the U.S. is trying to sell some of the planes to the Indians).  Malabar 05 will be followed up by a joint Indo-U.S. special operations exercise in Guam in January 2006. 

The USS Safeguard meanwhile also began conducting the first-ever salvage exercise (SALVEX) with the Indian navy on September 12 in and off the waters of Cochin. And on September 13, India officials announced that a joint U.S.-Indian "Yudh Abhyas" exercise began at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School near the Mizoram-Assam border town of Vairengte. It is the third exercise since U.S. soldiers started visiting the school for cooperative counter-terrorism work in April 2003. According to DOD documents, U.S. and Indian contingents will continue their anti-terrorism joint exercises January 16-31, 2006 at Choubatia in Uttar Pradesh. 

Indian and U.S. air force pilots also recently conducted a set of week-long flying exchanges between Misawa airbase in Japan and an Indian base, where U.S. pilots got to fly a Russian-made SU-30 fighter jet. The exchange visits are in preparation for a "Cope India" exercise scheduled for November. The bilateral training exercise will be the second in India in less than two years. Representatives from the Indian military also observed the U.S. "Cope Thunder" exercise in Alaska in June.

All of this comes at a time when India and Russia are preparing their first-ever joint army exercise involving their own paratrooper drop in Rajasthan's Aravali hills to destroy a "terrorist" base, scheduled for October. And India, China and Russia are also planning what Moscow describes as "the biggest military exercise in the world" in 2006, follow-on to the Russian-Chinese "Peace Mission 2005."

It's always about peace.

There will be a quiz on Friday.

Just when that Korea problem was all solved. Is it just me, or is some of the best military talent being assigned to the Pacific and Korea/China problem? Last week, the Pentagon announced the assignment of Army Gen. Burwell B. ("BB") Bell as commander of U.S. Forces Korea and combined U.S. and South Korean forces, as well as the assignment of Air Force Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, as deputy commander, U.S. Pacific Command. They join other top managers and war fighters already assigned to the Pacific theater.

Maybe I'll get a call back now. Longstanding "acting" Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Larry Di Rita is finally going to get to do something he is actually interested in, as the White House announced this week that Dorrance Smith, former executive producer of ABC's This Week, assistant to former President Bush for media affairs, and former media adviser for the Coalition Provision Authority in Baghdad would become the new Pentagon spokesperson. In a April 25, 2005 op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, Smith said "Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and al Qaeda have a partner in Al- Jazeera and, by extension, most networks in the U.S." I guess someone in charge of winning the battle for hearts and minds will now have to work overtime with him at the podium.

This is also certain to win hearts and minds. Raytheon Missile Systems announced that it had delivered "a short-range millimeter wave directed energy non-lethal weapon to the Department of Defense's Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) program -- also known as Project Sheriff -- for the Office of Force Transformation (OFT)." For those who do read English, this will be the first ever anti-personnel microwave weapon to be deployed by the United States (or probably any other country).

The beam heats the skin to levels of excruciating pain, encouraging anyone who comes in contact with the beam to flee. Raytheon is incorporating the microwave weapon into a Stryker combat vehicle, ultimate destination Iraq. "The millimeter wave energy beam can help discriminate the threat and assess the intent of an aggressor with a temporary reversible effect whose safety has been established and demonstrated in more than 12 years of testing by the Air Force Research Laboratory with sponsorship from the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate," Raytheon says. In fact the whole program has been saved by the Iraq war; it was previously floundering because despite constant incantations that the weapon was safe, sane military commanders and leaders didn't want to be the first to employ it.

The experience of space cadets. DOD announced this week that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence intends to award a "sole source" contract to Toffler Associates on Manchester, MA. The firm is the offspring of futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler, authors of The Third Wave, War & Anti-War, and Future Shock. Sole source. I guess there isn't any other company that can provides recommendations "for the standup of a Defense Intelligence Human Capital management office to manage and administer the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)."

The Department of Homeland Security Red Cell.  Thanks to RH, DS, RA, RB, and GG for their contributions to uncover a list of "Red Cell" big-thinkers. 

Daniel S. Gressang IV, faculty, Joint Military Intelligence College 
Benjamin D. Goss, academic, 2004 Super Bowl Red Cell 
Dr. Colby Burke Jubenville, Sports Management, Middle Tennessee State      University, 2004 Super Bowl Red Cell 
Dr. Tim Kotnour, University of Central Florida 
Brennan McKernan, DHS Red Cell 
Brad Meltzer, Montgomery Country based Washington themed fiction book author 
Jon Nowick, DHS Director, Analytic Red Cell Program 
Dr. Jim Pearson, University of Central Florida 
Robert ("Bob") Rich, Dr. Randy Shumaker, University of Central Florida 
Brad Thor, military thriller author 
Andy Wright, DHS Program Manager, Analytic Red Cell Program
Others suggested "rock star" Jeff "Skunk" Baxter, late of the Doobie Brothers, who has also gotten into national security consulting and is one of the Pentagon "experts" on ballistic missile defense.

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (10) 

Posted at 11:38 AM ET, 09/23/2005
Rita Shows New Rules Not Needed
Many readers have responded to my reporting on the issue of the military's domestic role this week, almost evenly split between those who believe something needs to be done to give the President more authority to respond to emergencies, and those who don't. A number of readers have lamented that Washington will likely do what it does best: reorganize. This from Gimlet: "Just as there was little need to overhaul intelligence agencies after 9/11 (there was a need to fire some people), there is no need to expand military authority now in support of civil emergency operations."

Rita is proving so far that we don't need a change in laws or a reorganization to adequately respond to disasters.

"Our armed forces have pre-positioned troops," the President said at the Pentagon Wednesday. "We have resources there to help the federal, state and local officials to respond swiftly and effectively."

That's the way it should be, local and state first, federal and military assisting.

In contrast with Katrina, Lt. Gen. Robert Clark, commander of the Fifth Army at Ft. Sam Houston in San Antonio, was put in charge of Joint Task Force Rita before the storm hit.

Thousands of National Guard troops have been on the move for days. Active duty military resources up to and including Air Force U-2s and reconnaissance satellites are in support.

It's such an orderly process, when you are prepared and paying attention, that is. "As directed by the secretary of defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan … [DOD] is supporting Homeland Security Department and FEMA disaster preparation efforts," the Pentagon said yesterday.

I am also struck by the irony of National Guard troops overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan while active duty troops are being "mobilized" here. Perhaps even more fundamental restructuring needs to take in the National Guard: Focus it more on State and domestic missions first. Guard units at the State level would organize around disaster response, civil affairs, engineering, transport and military police units, and once state and domestic needs were fulfilled, then "combat" units would be created. This might require the elimination of units likes field artillery and MLRS in the Guard, shifting the burden of specialized combat to the reserves and active military.

Can't be done because the size of the active military has so shrunk that it is dependent on the Guard for mobilization for the big one? Which big one are we talking about? I remember I had a conversation with a senior Defense Department official a few years back when pre-9/11 Rumsfeld cut back B-1 bomber units in the Air Force. I asked how the Pentagon saw generating a sustained long-range bombing campaign, say in a war with China, and he said, well Bill, if you want to have a traditional force structure capable of fighting China then we need a lot bigger military and even more heavy bombers. The bottom line is, we make choices about how to use limited resources even in these times of gargantuan military spending.

Maybe the preparations for Hurricane Rita won't provoke the big change, and maybe the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA will perform well enough to alleviate some of the criticism and take some of the heat off.

But something is still wrong with our post 9/11 domestic set-up, and the way we look at even purely civil "homeland security" preparedness (do we have to call it that?). The President isn't going to some FEMA command center or homeland security bunker to monitor Rita.  Tonight, he'll be arriving at Northern Command (NORTHCOM) headquarters in Colorado Springs. 
 

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (18) 

Posted at 09:19 AM ET, 09/22/2005
DOD: No New Rules Needed
Weeks before hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf coast, the Pentagon drafted new policies regarding the use of the military in the United States.

The drafts -- marked "For Official Use Only" and "Pre-Decisional" and obtained by this Washington Post blogger -- should put to rest concerns that there is a need to modify or repeal the Posse Comitatus Act to give the President more flexibility to employ the armed forces in any emergency.

There is no such need.  The President already has all the flexibility he needs.  But you wouldn’t have known if from the cries for help this week.

First, Sen. John Warner (R.-VA) asked the Pentagon to review "the entire legal framework" governing the President's power to use active duty military forces in domestic roles.

Then Coast Guard Vice Adm. Thad Allen, the Katrina recovery commander, went on the record saying that "federalization without consultation" with state and local authorities may be needed in future disasters. "I'm talking about something you could do whether the state requests anything or not," he said.

Other Senate leaders have joined Warner in calling for a greater military role and changed standards. "The fear … of federal military usurping state and local authority and, in the worst case, martial law … has to give way to the reality of lives on the line," says Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D.-CT).

Warner, Allen, Lieberman, as well as Rumsfeld's spokesman Larry Di Rita, are all wrong. There is nothing that stands in the way of the military rendering emergency assistance, and what is more, if the President had wanted to fly in the 82nd Airborne even without State approval, he could have done so and the military could have taken his order without concern for its directives.

The problem with the response to Katrina was federal government incompetence and inattention, not any regulations or laws. Maybe these calls for changing the law are just a way of avoiding responsibility.

The two Defense Department documents, one a directive entitled Defense Support of Civil Authorities (PDF) and the other, an accompanying 190-page DoD Manual for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (PDF) are dated June 27.

They two documents make clear that the DOD's position is that the military can provide support to civil authorities, and even act as a lead agency in the face of a breakdown of civil command and control (the Allen scenario) in accordance with the National Response Plan and current law.

The policy drafts should also provide some comfort that Defense Department officials remain clear on the primacy of civilian authority and response. What is more, the new directives lay out strict "criteria" to assess whether the military should undertake civilian missions, specifically political and legal "appropriateness," "a clear end state," and no infringement on military readiness.

 On March 25, 2003, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz appointed former Congressman Paul McHale as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. McHale was charged with overseeing DOD homeland defense activities and developing policies for support to civil authorities. His draft policies will replace an earlier 1997 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities directive and the 1994 DoD Manual for Civil Emergencies. 

 The two new draft documents update and streamline other existing directives and manuals relevant to homeland defense and support to civil authorities in light of reorganizations since 9/11, but substantively make no real changes to the policy that DOD "shall cooperate" with civil authorities consistent with "applicable laws, Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and DOD directives."

 On could argue that the Clinton era directive sets forth more rigorous criteria -- legality (compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk (safety of DOD forces), cost (who pays and impact on DOD budget), appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in DOD’s interest to conduct), and readiness (impact on the DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission) -- but this as much reflects the previous administration's reluctance to use military force as it does some greater desire on the part of the military to take over today.

 The new draft manual makes clear the military's role: 

 "First responsibility for support to the local incident response is with the State in which the disaster occurs. When State resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, Governors may request Federal assistance under a Presidential disaster or emergency declaration. Federal assistance is initiated when a disaster is so severe that a State's ability to provide response is overcome. … The DoD Components shall not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary on a temporary basis under conditions of Immediate Response. Any commander who is directed, or undertakes, to perform such functions shall facilitate the reestablishment of civil responsibility at the earliest time possible."

 The draft directive states that "Any DoD Component or military commander may provide immediate response … to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions." 

Immediate response is defined as: 

"Any form of immediate action taken by a DoD Component or military commander, under the authority of this Directive and any supplemental guidance prescribed by the Head of a DoD Component, to assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from the DoD Components and Agencies are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) … All such necessary action is referred to as 'Immediate Response.'" 

The draft Manual states that "When guidance cannot be obtained from higher headquarters on a timely basis, due to attack on the United States or other emergency circumstances, the DoD Components should apply DoD resources to DSCA [defense support of civil authorities] in the following order of priority: To save human life and mitigate human suffering, and to protect essential U.S. Government capabilities…"

The draft Manual does state that "The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies" if and when any one of four conditions applies: 

 "A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; 
The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; 
More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or 
The Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President."
I guess one could take the final condition as ominous, but the conditions and authorities of the President in his constitutional role to order the military into action in an emergency are not any different from the pre 9/11 policies.

What is more, the new DOD directives exactly mirror the National Response Plan, which says on pages 42-43 (thanks KG): 

"Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive and pre-approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385). All such necessary action is referred to as 'Immediate Response.'"

Maybe readers will see something in these two documents that I don't see. But now we have Hurricane Rita to test my interpretation. 

I doubt that we will see the President or other Congressional leaders claiming this time that the military can't respond quickly and appropriately. That's because this time they are paying attention.

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (23) 

Posted at 07:21 AM ET, 09/21/2005
Today in DC: Commandos in the Streets?
Today, somewhere in the DC metropolitan area, the military is conducting a highly classified Granite Shadow "demonstration." 

Granite Shadow is yet another new Top Secret and compartmented operation related to the military’s extra-legal powers regarding weapons of mass destruction. It allows for emergency military operations in the United States without civilian supervision or control. 

A spokesman at the Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR) confirmed the existence of Granite Shadow to me yesterday, but all he would say is that Granite Shadow is the unclassified name for a classified plan.

That classified plan, I believe, after extensive research and after making a couple of assumptions, is CONPLAN 0400, formally titled Counter-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 0400 is a long-standing contingency plan of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) that serves as the umbrella for military efforts to counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It has extensively been updated and revised since 9/11.

The CJCS plan lays out national policy and priorities for dealing with WMD threats in peacetime and crisis -- from far away offensive strikes and special operations against foreign WMD infrastructure and capabilities, to missile defenses and "consequence management" at home if offensive efforts fail.

All of the military planning incorporates the technical capabilities of the intelligence agencies and non-military organizations such as the national laboratories of the Department of Energy. And finally, CONPLAN 0400 directs regional combatant commanders to customize counter-proliferation plans for each of their own areas of operations. 

When that "area of operations" is the United States, things become particularly sensitive. 

That's where Granite Shadow comes in. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the military's new homeland security command, is preparing its draft version of CONPLAN 0400 for military operations in the United States, and the resulting Granite Shadow plan has been classified above Top Secret by adding a Special Category (SPECAT) compartment restricting access.

The sensitivities, according to military sources, include deployment of "special mission units" (the so-called Delta Force, SEAL teams, Rangers, and other special units of Joint Special Operations Command) in Washington, DC and other domestic hot spots. NORTHCOM has worked closely with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), as well as the secret branches of non-military agencies and departments to enforce "unity of command" over any post 9/11 efforts.

Further, Granite Shadow posits domestic military operations, including intelligence collection and surveillance, unique rules of engagement regarding the use of lethal force, the use of experimental non-lethal weapons, and federal and military control of incident locations that are highly controversial and might border on the illegal.

Granite Shadow is the twin to Power Geyser, a program I first revealed to The New York Times in January. The JFHQ spokesman confirms that Granite Shadow and Power Geyser are two different unclassified names for two different classified plans.

In the case of Power Geyser, the classified plan is CJCS CONPLAN 0300, whose entire title is classified. According the military documents, the unclassified title is "Counter-Terrorism Special Operations Support to Civil Agencies in the event of a domestic incident." It is another Top Secret/SPECAT plan directing the same special mission units to provide weapons of mass destruction recovery and "render safe" in either a terrorist incident or in the case of a stolen (or lost) nuclear weapon. Render safe refers to the ability of explosive ordnance disposal experts to isolate and disarm any type of biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological weapon.

The obvious question is why there is a need for two plans. My guess is that Power Geyser and CONPLAN 0300 refers to operations in support of a civil agency "lead" (most likely the Attorney General for a WMD attack) while Granite Shadow and CONPLAN 0400 lays out contingencies where the military is in the lead.  I'll wait to be corrected by someone in the know.

Both plans seem to live behind a veil of extraordinary secrecy because military forces operating under them have already been given a series of ''special authorities'' by the President and the secretary of defense. These special authorities include, presumably, military roles in civilian law enforcement and abrogation of State's powers in a declared or perceived emergency.

In January, when The New York Times reported on the Power Geyser name from my Code Names website, the Pentagon argued that "It would be irresponsible … to comment on any classified program that may or may not exist."

I can't see how the Defense Department can continue this line of argument post-Katrina. We see the human cost of a system of contingency planning done in complete secret, with a lack of any debate as to what should be the federal government's priorities, emphasis, and rules.

As the Granite Shadow commandos and their federal brethren go through their paces today, some inside the system will lament that I have "compromised" their work. But the very fact that nothing in my writing damages the Granite Shadow effort should demonstrate that we can have a discussion of contingency planning priorities in the United States, and debate extraordinary special authorities granted to those in uniform, without compromising the details of the plans themselves.

There's still time. The full-scale exercise of Granite Shadow's capabilities and procedures doesn’t start until April 2006.

A note to readers: Today begins a weekly feature of Early Warning, namely code name of the week. This will endeavor to discuss some secret program of the government, sometimes with an argument that the secrecy is excessive, sometime with far more questions than answers.

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (98) 

Posted at 07:55 AM ET, 09/20/2005
Rumsfeld to Katrina: "Thanks"
Virginia Sen. John Warner (R.-VA) asked Donald Rumsfeld last week to conduct a "thorough review" of presidential authority to use the armed forces to "restore public order" in an emergency like Katrina. His letter (PDF) unleashed a torrent of speculation that lawmakers will soon modify or even repeal the Posse Comitatus Act, to some a thread-thin security blanket between civilian rule and martial law. 

The back story?  Warner, the long-standing chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is either confusing the President's inadequate response with legal handcuffs that don't actually exist, or he's playing the oldest Washington game in the book: asking the Defense Department to do something it already wants to do.  I'm betting the latter. 

Nothing in law prevents the President from employing the military in a Katrina-like emergency if state and local government really breaks down.  In fact, the 130-year-old Posse Comitatus Act more symbolizes the military's subordination to civil authority than it actually restricts what the military can do.

And Warner, of all people, should be well aware that long before Katrina, the military began rewriting its policies, manuals, and war plans associated with what it now calls "defense support of civil authorities."   Post 9/11 military contingency planning for "emergency" and "immediate" response by the Pentagon is already in the process of marginalizing any previously perceived legal constraints (more on this later this week.).

"The military" for its part, if there is such a monolith, also has no greater interest in taking on nation building here than it does overseas. You know the mantra: The military exists to fight and win the nation's wars, yadda, yadda.   It isn't the uniformed military that's confused about its position in society.  But there is a growing cadre of mostly civilian homeland security zealots in and around the Pentagon, and they, I think, are the problem.

A little background: The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) provides that “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse Comitatus [Latin for "power of the county"] or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined … or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”   The PCA generally prohibits federal military personnel from interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuit and seizures; or making arrests on behalf of civilian law enforcement authorities.  The PCA applies to all of the federal uniformed services by statute or DOD policy.  It does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard.

The law finds its origins in local sheriff use of federal troops to enforce law on the western frontier (particularly the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850) and military deployments to the south during reconstruction to maintain law and order.  Questions about military influence in the voting process in the election of 1876 led to passage of the Act in 1878.  It thus restricted the right of US marshals and local sheriffs to conscript military personnel into their posses.

Explicit constitutional or statutory authority must be invoked before federal military forces can be utilized in domestic law enforcement, but the list of exceptions is vast: an extremely broadly defined Insurrection Act, missions in protection of the president, foreign VIPs, and in continuity of government, protection of public lands, execution of quarantine and certain health laws, removal of persons unlawfully on Indian lands, actions taken in support of the neutrality laws, execution of certain civil rights warrants, and actions in support of certain customs laws.

Furthermore, the statute, my military friends say, does not limit the president's constitutional power to direct actions that might otherwise be prohibited. This includes protection of military personnel, equipment, assets, and bases, and use of the military under special authorities in situations in response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction or nuclear materials. 

What is more, actions that are taken "under the inherent right of the U.S. Government, a sovereign national entity under the U.S. Constitution, to ensure the preservation of public order and to carry out governmental operations within its territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force, if necessary" are not restricted. 

No wonder the meager restrictions of Posse Comitatus are such an emotional issue.  In that regard, Sen. Warner did something extremely useful in his letter, which is to prod Rumsfeld, as he also did after 9/11, to redouble the Defense Department's efforts to "better publicize the existing statutory limits on the use of the armed forces for such purposes," to point out that "there is still a potential element of confusion about what the Department can and cannot do under present law with the regular armed forces." 

The problem here is that Donald Rumsfeld and his ever growing Industry of Military Complexes devoted to homeland security and counter-terrorism seem to be intentionally bad mouthing Posse Comitatus and connecting it to Katrina in order to earn themselves greater operational flexibility in the United States. 

Last week Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita was Rumsfeld's front man in this effort: According to a September 17 Associated Press story, the Secretary "is reviewing a wide range of possible changes in the way the military could be used in domestic emergencies," Di Rita said Friday.  He said these included "possible changes in the relationship between federal and state military authorities."  Di Rita called the Posse Comitatus Act "very archaic," and stated that it limited the Pentagon's flexibility in responding.

Contrast his statement with the thoughts of cooler headed Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who is also a lawyer in the Air Force reserve.  "I am not comfortable with suspending local laws and state laws and allowing American military people to come into any community, arrest people and seize property, unless there is a very good reason," Graham told FOX News Sunday.  "The Posse Comitatus Act goes back to the 1880's in our history, and it's a prohibition against the federal military coming in and taking over a local community or a state and becoming law enforcement officers," he added.  Graham said we might have to look at the laws to make sure the military "can provide assistance" when needed.  "But we should not allow the federal government, willy-nilly, to take over state and local functions in terms of law enforcement."

So either Di Rita doesn’t understand the true restrictions and intent of the law, in which case his statement is incompetent, or he's part of the set-up, in which case he should win an Oscar.

Even before Katrina, contingency planners at the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), the military's new homeland security command in Colorado Springs, were given marching orders by Rumsfeld to plan for the worst possible contingency domestically. The resulting plan, currently in draft and called CONPLAN 2002 (watch this space), is predicated on a scenario in which the Defense Department would have to take "the lead" from the Department of Homeland Security, civil agencies, and the States, that is, to act without civil authority.

I think we call that martial law. 

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (30) 

Posted at 07:30 AM ET, 09/19/2005
The Pressure Cooker at Homeland Security
As FEMA recovers from Katrina, and the military gets ready to take over responsibility for everything, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) squeaks by, wasting our money and squandering its time. 
 

DHS likes to say that it is thinking out of the box in getting inside the minds of terrorists. Its main vehicle to do so is its so called "Red Cell," a group of consultants established "to complement traditional intelligence-based threat projections by taking an 'out of the box' approach that is achieved by drawing on the talents of a broad range of individuals, such as best-selling authors, academics, the military, and pop musicians." 

A year ago, the Red Cell published a "For Official Use Only" report How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane and published here for the first time, to respond to a DHS request "to speculate on possible terrorist exploitation of a high category hurricane." 
 

The only reason I can imagine why the four page report is stamped "For Official Use Only" and carries the warning that "any release, dissemination, or sharing of this document, or any information contained herein, is not authorized" is to hide the fact of how inane the analysis is. 

"Terrorists are unlikely to exploit a hurricane," the report’s summary begins. It took "experts" to conclude this? And why go on for four pages if that’s what they came up with? 

I guess there are two reasons. First, I suppose that the 35 experts who took the taxpayer's money, drank the taxpayer's coffee and ate the taxpayer's donuts as they toiled away in their Booz Allen Hamilton conference room, felt obligated to report back something. 

Second, I guess they felt they needed to warn federal and local law enforcement agencies. "It is conceivable that a terrorist group like al-Qaida, if it had plans in place for an attack elsewhere in the region or country, might attempt to time such an attack to a hurricane," the Red Cell concludes. 

But they then contradict themselves, saying "The participants assessed that a splinter terrorist cell or a lone actor, rather than an established terrorist group, would be more likely to exploit a hurricane on site. This could include persons pursuing a political agenda, religious extremists, or other disgruntled individuals." Those who would promiscuously reference Al Qaeda of course aren't pursuing a political agenda. 

The brilliant out-of-the-box thinkers put forth a number of silly recommendations: "maintain nationwide security and emergency preparedness … observe and report casing of critical infrastructure by unfamiliar vehicles … report missing personnel and equipment … increased security procedures [at evacuation centers] …" 
 

How about this one? "Increase patrols and vigilance of staff at key transportation and evacuation points (for instance, bridges and tunnels), including watching for unattended vehicles at these locations."  Boy, I hope someone has reported all of the unattended vehicles in Louisiana and Mississippi.

And finally, "increased security procedures at shelters" … and "ensure that food and other emergency relief supplies are secure." 

Increased security procedures at shelters? Ensure that food and other emergency relief supplies are secure? How about assuring that food and relief supplies are even delivered?

 Supposedly, the Red Cellers are issuing a dozen or so of these reports a year. I couldn't find a list of them and I would sure like to know how much they cost. But since 2003 (thanks MS for providing help on this), the DHS has issued alerts on: 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials available to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. 
Ricin Delivered by Mail. 
Potential Terrorist use of Official Identification, Uniforms or Vehicles. 
Potential Threat to Ferryboats. 
Potential for Terrorist Use of Rental Vehicles: Indicators for the Car, Truck and Limousine Rental Company in the U.S. 
Potential Terrorist use of Self Storage Facilities in the U.S. 
Compressed Gas Cylinders as Components of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to destroy buildings. 
Potential Terrorist Exploitation of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems. 
Potential Terrorist Use of Emergency Vehicles to Circumvent Security Procedures. 
Terrorist Interest in Concentrated Hydrogen Peroxide. 
Potential Terrorist Use of Helicopters in the U.S. 
Potential vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) vulnerability. 
Improvised chemical device threat involving toxic chemical materials and delivery methods at public venues. 
Terrorism attacks against American shopping centers, malls and fast-food restaurants using chemical and biological agents, backpack bombs and firearms. 
Targeting U.S. passenger trains, possibly using operatives who have a Western appearance.
 And my favorite:  The "For Official Use Only" report about Potential Terrorist Use of Pressure Cookers. I always suspected that my mother was up to no good. 

There are just so many warnings about so many areas covering so much of the day-to-day life of America. The cumulative effect is to provide no useful warning at all. 
 

The 2005 DHS Appropriations Bill contains $18.8 million for "the establishment of physical and cyber target risk analysis teams using analytic ‘red cell’ and operational ‘red team’ procedures to evaluate protective measures … in the protection of key assets and critical infrastructure." So maybe Congress should, uh, look into this waste of time and money. 

I'd love to publicize the names of those individuals participating in the Red Cell effort. John Mintz did a profile of the Red Cell program, "Homeland Security Employs Imagination," for the Post last year, noting that the participants had to sign a nondisclosure agreement. I’m all about disclosure here. I’ll send a free, signed Code Names book to anyone who can provide a list of Red Cell government consultants. 
 
 
 
 

By William M. Arkin | Permalink* | Comments (33) 

Posted at 12:09 PM ET, 09/16/2005
Documents Library
Natural Disasters Perfunctory Concerns
September 15, 2005
 Comprehensive Homeland Security Exercise Schedule (Exclusive to Early Warning) (PDF)

Michael Brown Was Set Up: It's All in the Numbers
September 14, 2005
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (PDF)
National Planning Scenarios (For Official Use Only, Exclusive to Early Warning) (PDF)
National Response Plan (PDF)
National Preparedness Guidance (PDF)

By Michael Corones | Permalink* | Email a Comment 

Posted at 08:05 AM ET, 09/16/2005
A broader role for the armed forces?
Amidst all of President Bush's proposals last night was one decree that the Commander-in-Chief can implement without Congressional or public intervention: "It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces -- the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice."

The President has hit upon a seemingly no-brainer solution: Rely more on the one institution in our society that is most respected and competent.

The President’s plan is both wrong-headed and dangerous. 

I for one don't want to live in a society where "a moment’s notice" justifies military action that either preempts or usurps civil authority. 

What is more, nothing about what happened in New Orleans justifies such a radical move to give the military what bureaucrats call "a lead role" in responding to emergencies.

In the wake of Katrina, the military was standing by awaiting orders, as it should be.  The White House and the federal government were for their part either on vacation or out to lunch. The problem wasn’t the lack of resources available. It was leadership, decisiveness, foresight. The problem was commanding and mobilizing the resources, civil and military. 

The President's plan is also wrong-headed in that it lets the Department of Homeland Security off the hook. If such a department hadn't been set up after 9/11, I might reluctantly conclude that the military is the only institution that could do the job in such a large scale catastrophe. 

But it does exist, and it needs to be held accountable and redirected to safeguard the American people and respond to emergencies. A well run FEMA with the right marching orders (people first, fabulous weapons of mass destruction Hollywood scenarios as time permits) can quickly call upon military resources, as it could have in Katrina. 

The change that is needed is for the White House and Congress to admit that they over compensated for the shock of 9/11 by focusing too much on WMD and terrorism at the cost of basic domestic preparedness.